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Abstract
This study investigates the appropriate measure for stabilizing inflation in the Euro
Area. We use a model that accounts for both the heterogeneity observed in the degree of
price rigidities across regions and sectors, and asymmetry of real disturbances in relative
prices. Our work shows that the optimal weights to assign to each region or sector result
from complex interactions between the degree of price stickiness, economic size and the
distribution of shocks within regions.
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1 Introduction
The importance given to stabilizing inflation is not only in line with the ECBs primary ob-
jective as imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, but also with opinion in the academic literature,
where, complete price stability within the class of sticky price models, constitutes a robust op-
timal monetary policy.4 However, heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness across regions
and sectors, and asymmetry in the shocks is characteristic of the Euro Area. Therefore the
practical implementation of targeted inflation policy crucially depends on which measure of in-
flation the ECB needs to establish to offset the distortions caused by price volatility. This paper
investigates optimal inflation targeting for the Euro Area using a multi-region and sector model
with asymmetric demand shocks.
At present, the ECB stabilizes the Monetary Union Index of Consumer Prices (MUICP),
which is a sum of the single regions HICP indexes, weighted by the economic size of each
region. This practice is in stark contrast with recent academic results that conclude that in a
two-region model, optimal monetary policy must target inflation in the region with the highest
degree of nominal rigidities instead of using an aggregate measure of inflation across regions.5
This naturally raises the question of whether monetary policy should take into account the
dispersion of inflation across regions and sectors in the Euro Area, which is characterized by
different degrees of nominal price rigidities and asymmetric shocks across regions and sectors.
The idea of stabilizing a core price index is in the Keynesian tradition of focusing on a core
rather than an overall cost of living index. This is also in line with the monetarist recommen-
dation to stabilize a long-run index and ignore relative price movement such as oil price shocks
(Goodfriend and King, 1997). In the empirical literature, Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) and Cog-
ley (2002) identify core inflation as a more persistent component of inflation and consider it,
from a policy point of view to be a more important indicator than broader inflation measure-
ment, since fluctuations in food and energy prices are regarded as transitory components of
overall movements in inflation.
4See Woodford (2003) and references therein.
5See Benigno (2004). A similar result holds in a two-sector model, as shown in Aoki (2001). We discuss these
studies in the rest of the introduction.
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Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004) use a theoretical model to formalize these main empirical
results. Aoki (2001) develops a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with a flexible-
price sector along with a sticky-price sector and shows that the optimal monetary policy (char-
acterized as an inflation targeting regime) stabilizes core inflation rather than a broader measure
of inflation. Benigno (2004) focuses on the optimal policy in a currency area and develops a two
region model. Benigno’s main conclusion is that the optimal plan can be approximated by what
he calls a second best solution. This allows for a context of asymmetric shocks and a different
level of price rigidities between regions, and minimizes a welfare criterion that accounts for the
exact magnitude of all the distortions in the economy. This is an inflation targeting policy in
which greater weight is given to inflation in those regions characterized by a higher degree of
nominal rigidity.
Our paper extends this line of research. We use the microeconomic evidence on the fre-
quency of price adjustments in the Euro Area to verify whether the ‘stickiness principle’ un-
derlined by the baseline models (Benigno, 2004 and Aoki, 2001) still holds in a more realistic
multi-region setting. Moreover, given that differences in the frequency of price adjustment are
significant not only across regions but also across sectors, we also investigate the difference
between sectoral inflation targeting and region inflation targeting. This aspect is of crucial
importance for the ECB which faces the challenge of aggregating Euro Area inflation across
sectors and regions.
We develop a multi-region/sector model by focusing on 10 regions and 10 sectors, and
go on derive a microfounded welfare function. We then use this criterion to determine the
unconditional optimal monetary policy as described in Woodford (2003) and we compare it
with two alternative policy regimes. First, a pure inflation-targeting regime, in which aggregate
inflation is based on weighting inflation for each region/sector according to its economic size.
Second, an optimal inflation-targeting regime, in which the weights for each region/sectors
inflation are chosen optimally. We calculate the welfare deadweight loss of these two alternative
regimes against the optimal policy that minimizes the microfounded welfare function.
The analysis establishes the following results. First, a pure inflation-targeting regime, in
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which aggregate inflation is based on inflation weighting for each region/sector according to its
economy size, is always suboptimal. The only exception is the case in which all regions/sectors
have the same price stickiness. In all the other cases there is an optimal set of weights that do
not coincide with the relative size of the regions/sectors. In addition, the optimal inflation target
turns out to be a close proxy of optimal monetary policy since the welfare loss implied by these
two monetary regimes is very similar.
Differing from a two region model, the presence of multiple regions and asymmetric de-
mand shocks that impact on the natural level of relative prices, produces optimal weights from
complex interactions between the degree of price stickiness, economic size and the distribution
of the shocks within regions. In this case the ‘stickiness principle’ is less evident. Our results
show that implementing the optimal inflation target is a difficult task for the ECB and there is
not a simple rule-of-thumb rule that can be used to choose weights optimally.
Numerous related studies investigate optimal monetary policy under a variety of imperfec-
tions. Erceg et al. (2000) consider the case of distortions in goods and labor markets, Huang
and Liu (2005) study the effect of nominal rigidities in the production of intermediate goods,
and Bodenstein et al. (2008) focus on optimal policy when shocks originate in an energy sector.
The common policy prescription across these studies is that inflation stabilization should attach
more weights to the sectors in which nominal rigidities are more pronounced as they create
larger real distortions. More recently, some studies have extended the design of monetary pol-
icy for a currency area in different directions making such ‘stickiness principles’ less clear cut.
Lombardo (2006) considers a second source of heterogeneity across regions (i.e. a different
degree of competition) together with the different degrees of nominal rigidity and shows that
the weights attached to the region-specific inflation rates should increase with the degree of
competition, implying an ambiguous outcome on the inflation weights if the model requires a
positive correlation between price flexibility and degree of competition.
Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) deepen Benigno (2004) framework by assuming that a
fraction of firms set prices in a backward looking fashion. They find that the optimal inflation
targeting policy model, which re-weighs countries according to degrees of rigidity and their
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component of backward looking firms and their output gap stabilization policy, performs better
than the HICP inflation targeting only for some calibrations of the model in terms of welfare,
thus suggesting that it may not be desirable for the ECB to abandon HICP targeting. Finally,
Eusepi et al. (2011) develop a multi-sector New Keynesian model, calibrated to match U.S.
data on price stickiness, labor shares and inflation across sectors, to show that optimal inflation
targeting can be closely approximated by a core inflation target which does not include the more
volatile components of the PCE-based price index.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides evidence on hetero-
geneity in the Euro Area across regions and sectors. Section 3 lays out the theoretical model.
Section 4 derives the welfare function and outlines the optimal monetary policy and inflation
targeting plans. Section 5 describes the calibration of the model. Section 6 reports the results
of the simulations. Section 7 contains the conclusions.
2 Heterogeneity in Euro Area regions and sectors
In this section, we compare the size and frequency of price adjustment for regions and
sectors within the Euro Area, using the micro evidence of price setting for Euro Area countries
in Dhyne et al. (2006). We focus on 10 regions within this area and on 10 macro sectors.
The number of regions and sectors considered is primarily related to data availability on the
frequency of price changes. We will use this information to calibrate the theoretical model
described in the next section.
Consumer price inflation in the Euro Area is measured by the Harmonized Index of Con-
sumer Prices (HICP), compiled by Eurostat and the national statistical institutes using har-
monized statistical methods. Each Member State measures the month to month movements
in sector prices as an average of price indexes, using expenditure weights (ns), which are an
appropriate reflection of consumption patterns . The HICP is classified according to the four-
digit categories and sub-categories of the Classification Of Individual Consumption by Purpose
(COICOP). HICPs provide the basis for compiling the Monetary Union Index of Consumer
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Prices (MUICP), which provides the official measure of inflation in the Euro Area. The MUICP
is calculated as a weighted average of the HICPs of the participating regions of the EMU, where
the weights (nr) are represented by the economic size of each region.6
The ECB remit is to maintain annual MUICP inflation rates below, but close to 2% over
the medium term. According to the theoretical academic results highlighted in the introduction,
the ECB choice to target aggregate inflation should consider not only the economic size of
regions/sectors, but also the distribution of price stickiness. The second column in Table 1
reports the economic size of each region (top table) and the economic size of each sector in the
economy (bottom table), calculated according to consumer expenditure in each region or sector.
Most of the larger regions measured in terms of consumption expenditure (e.g., Germany, Italy
and Spain), with the exception however of France, show a higher degree of price stickiness.
Looking at sectors, Restaurants and Hotels (which account for about thirty per cent of total
expenditure) show the lowest frequency of price adjustment while the Energy sector is the most
flexible sector in terms of price changes. The importance of the frequency of price adjustment
is evaluated in the fourth column by the duration of price contracts which can be approximated
by the reciprocity of price change frequency.7
The frequency of price changes, calculated within the Euro System Inflation Persistence
Network as an average over the period 1996-2001, represents the average share of prices that
are revised in a given month (see Dhyne et al., 2006 for its calculation). The monthly frequency
of price changes for the Euro Area is equal on average to 15.0%, while this works out at 24.8%
for the US, according to Bils and Klenow (2004) calculations on a sub-sample of 50 products.
According to Dhyne et al. (2006), the source of cross-region variation is likely to be both struc-
tural (consumption structure, outlet composition) and methodological (the treatment of sales
and quality adjustment by each National Statistical Institute), or reflects differences in the rel-
ative importance of regulated prices across regions. Nevertheless, Table 1 shows that there is a
6Up to 2000 the weight of a Member State is calculated as the share of private domestic consumption expen-
diture in the EMU, from 2001 the region weight of a member state is calculated as the share of household final
monetary consumption expenditure of the Euro Area.
7The duration of price contracts should be read with caution given that according to Dhyne et al. (2006), the
inverse frequency calculated as a proxy of average duration turns out to be systematically much lower than the
average duration.
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high degree of heterogeneity in price adjustments across both regions and sectors in the Euro
Area, which may represent an effective challenge for the conduct of monetary policy.
Table 1: Economic Size and Frequency of Price Adjustment in Europe
economic size (nr) frequency of average duration
price adjustment in quarters
Italy 19.9 10.0 3.3
Spain 12.5 13.3 2.5
Germany 30.0 13.5 2.5
Austria 3.3 15.4 2.1
Netherlands 5.4 16.2 1.9
Belgium 3.5 17.6 1.6
Finland 1.6 20.3 1.6
France 21.2 20.9 1.6
Portugal 2.3 21.1 1.6
Luxembourg 0.3 23.0 1.4
EURO AREA 15.1 2.2
US 24.8 1.3
economic size (ns) frequency of average duration
price adjustment in quarters
Restaurants and Hotels 30.3 4.2 7.9
Housing 2.7 6.5 5.1
Recreation and Culture 6.5 6.6 5.1
Furnishing, Household Equipment 5.0 7.2 4.6
Transport and Communications 8.5 7.2 4.6
Miscellaneous goods and services 4.8 7.3 4.5
Clothing 16.2 8.4 4.0
Processed food 7.4 12.5 2.7
Unprocessed food 7.8 37.2 0.9
Energy 10.8 78.8 0.4
Table Notes
nr : region share of household monetary consumption expenditure
ns: expenditure weights which reflect the consumption patterns of households
frequency of price adjustment: represents the average share of prices revised in a given month
average duration in quarters: inverse of the frequency of price adjustment
Source: Dhyne et al (2006) for Euro Area data; Bils and Klenow (2004) for the US
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3 The model
We develop a multi-region model similar to Benigno (2004) and Aoki (2001) to accommo-
date the microeconomic evidence on price stickiness across regions and sectors described in the
previous section. This addresses the question of what is the optimal inflation targeting policy
in a currency area such as the Euro Area.8 Ideally one would have to consider regions and
sectors in a joint model with two degrees of heterogeneity within regions and between regions.
In this paper, we are going to consider this model but with two different calibrations, focusing
respectively on different frequencies of price adjustment across both regions and sectors.9
The economy is made up of a continuum of agents defined over the unit interval [0, 1].
Each agent manufactures a single differentiated product, u, and consumes a fraction of all the
goods produced in the economy. In each region, a measure ni of goods is produced, with
i = 1, 2, ..., K, and the total sum of produced goods is normalized equal to one, such that∑K
i=1 ni = 1. All produced goods are traded across regions and there is no migration across
regions. Goods are differentiated and prices are set on a staggered basis. In the economy there
is a single central bank and K fiscal authorities, each of which has sovereignty over one region
only.
The demand side of the model comprises household’s j preferences defined by
U jt = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
U(Cjs) + L
(
M js
Ps
, ξi
)
− V (yjs, z
j
s)
]
,
where the upper index j denotes a variable that pertains to agent j, while the upper index i
denotes a variable specific to region i. The term Et denotes the expectation conditional on the
information set at date t, and the parameter β is the intertemporal discount factor 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
During each period s, each agent j gains utility from a consumer basket, Cjs , of goods produced
8The theoretical framework is also close and extends the works by Galı´ and Monacelli (2005) and Soffritti and
Zanetti (2008).
9We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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in region i, defined as
Cji ≡
[(
1
ni
) 1
σ
∫
u∈i
cj(u)
σ−1
σ du
] σ
σ−1
,
and this applies to the liquidity services of holding money (M js/Ps), while he/she receives
disutility from producing goods, V (yjs, zjs).
The terms ξi and zjs denote exogenous shocks to (region-specific) money holdings and
(agent-specific) disutility from production respectively. The consumption index, Cj , is defined
as Cj ≡
[∏K
i=1(C
j
i )
ni
] [∏K
i=1 ni
]
−1
, for i = 1, 2, ..., K. The parameter σ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution across goods produced within a region10, whereas the elasticity of substitution
between the bundles Ci is set equal to 1. The total demand for each good u produced in region
i is
ydi (u) =
(
p(u)
Pi
)
−σ (
CW
PRi
+Gi
)
,
where p(u) is the price of the product u, CW is union aggregate consumption, (defined asCW ≡∫ 1
0
Cjdj), PRi is the relative price in region i, defined as PRi ≡ Pi/P , where Pi =
∫ 1
0
p(u)du
and P =
[∏K
i=1(Pi)
ni
] [∏K
i=1 ni
]
−1
, Gi is public expenditure in region i.
Aggregate demand is represented by standard Euler equations derived by maximizing the
utility function subject to budget constraints for each household j in each region i.
The supply side of the model comprises imperfectly competitive firms that set prices as in
Calvo (1983). In each period, a seller faces a fixed probability 1− α of adjusting its price, and
receives a subsidy τ i that offsets the distortions generated by monopolistic competition in the
steady state. Producers in the same region set similar prices since they face the same discounted
future demands and future marginal costs under the hypothesis that the new price is maintained.
The optimal price, p˜t(u), is given by:
p˜t(u) =
σ
(σ − 1)(1− τ i)
Et
∑
∞
k=0(α
iβ)kVy(y˜
d
t,t+k(u), z
i
t+k)y˜
d
t,t+k(u)
Et
∑
∞
k=0(α
iβ)kλt+ky˜dt,t+k(u)
, (1)
10In this model σ is common to all regions. For an heterogeneous degree of competition see Lombardo (2006).
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where y˜dt,t+k(u) is the total demand for good u at time t + k, λt+k = UC(Ct+k)/Pt+k with
UC(Ct+k) denoting the marginal utility of consumption, and Vy(y˜dt,t+k(u), zit+k) is the derivative
of the disutility function V (·) with respect to total demand. The state equation for aggregate
prices in each region is:
P 1−σi,t = α
iP 1−σi,t−1 + (1− α
i)p˜t(u)
1−σ, (2)
for i = 1, 2, ..., K. Aggregate supply is represented by standard New Keynesian Phillips curves
derived by combining equations (1) and (2) for each region i.
The model is closed by requiring that the government of each region i maintain a balanced
budget, and assuming that the instrument of monetary policy is set in terms of the one period
risk-free interest rate on the nominal bonds denominated in the common currency.
3.1 Equilibrium under flexible and sticky prices
We first focus on fluctuations around the steady state in the flexible-price model since it is the
relevant equilibrium for welfare evaluation. We then describe the model with sticky prices.
Before proceeding with the analysis some of the notation we use should be clarified. We
denote the log-deviation of Xt from its steady state in the flexible-price model with X˜t, while
Xˆt denotes the deviation of the same variable in the sticky-price model. A world variable XW
is defined as XW ≡
∑K
i=1 niXi. In addition, XRi denotes a relative variable with respect to the
world, defined as XRi ≡ Xi −XW .
The solution of the model with flexible prices is described by the equations:
C˜Wt =
η
ρ+ η
(Y¯ Wt − g
W
t ), (3)
Y˜ Wt =
η
ρ+ η
Y¯ Wt +
ρ
ρ+ η
gWt , (4)
P˜Ri,t =
η
1 + η
(gRi,t − Y¯
R
i,t), (5)
where Y¯ Ri,t (Y¯ Wt ) and gRi,t (gWt ) are region-specific (world) shocks to supply and government
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purchase respectively, and η and ρ respectively are the inverse elasticity of goods production
and the inter-temporal elasticity of consumption substitution. The natural interest rate, R˜t, in
equilibrium, under zero inflation rate, is
R˜t =
ρη
ρ+ η
Et[(Y¯
W
t+1 − Y¯
W
t )− (g
W
t+1 − g
W
t )]. (6)
The solution of the model with sticky prices is described by the standards Euler and aggre-
gate output equations:
EtCˆ
W
t+1 = Cˆ
W
t + ρ
−1(Rˆt − Etpi
W
t+1), (7)
Yˆi,t = −Pˆ
R
i,t + Cˆ
W
t + g
i
t, (8)
defined for each region i = 1, 2, ..., K. Similarly, the aggregate supply equation for each region
i = 1, 2, ..., K, is equal to:
piit = βEtpi
i
t+1 − k
i
P (Pˆ
R
i,t − P˜
R
i,t) + k
i
C(Cˆ
W
t − C˜
W
t ), (9)
which shows that region-specific inflation rates depend on the expectations of future price set-
ting behavior11 as well as on both the deviations of the union output gap from zero and rela-
tive prices from their natural rates. In addition, the definition of relative price for each region
i = 1, 2, ..., K implies
PˆRi,t = Pˆ
R
i,t−1 + pi
i
t − pi
W
t . (10)
The equilibrium dynamics of the variables {C˜Wt , Y˜ Wt , P˜Ri,t, R˜t, CˆWt , Yˆi,t, PˆRi,t, PˆRi,t, piit, piWt , Rˆt}
is described by equations (3) - (10) together with the equation for the monetary policy rule and
the definitions of world variables CˆWt and piWt .
11Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) allow for an hybrid model in which past inflation plays a role in the inflation
dynamics that we do not consider.
2Note that kiC ≡ [(1− αiβ)(1− αi)/αi][(ρ+ η)/(1 + ρη)], and kiP = kiC [(1 + η)/(ρ+ η)].
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3.2 Shocks structure
Following Benigno (2004) we impose an asymmetric demand shock. We implement this shock
by assuming that the natural level of relative prices P˜Ri,t moves proportionally to the exogenous
process ζt defined as follows:
P˜Ri,t = piζt
with
ζt = φζt−1 + εt,
where εt is a white noise shock with zero mean and variance equal to σ2ǫ . We assume that
all regions show the same persistence of the shock affecting the flexible relative prices whose
variance is σ2
P˜Ri,t
=p2iσ
2
ǫ .
In order for the shock structure to be consistent, given that the shocks refer to relative prices,
we need to impose the following constraint:
K∑
i=1
nipi = 0. (11)
Equation (11) describes how the shock is distributed across regions. In a two-region model
only the shock to one region needs to be imposed for the shock to the other region to be auto-
matically calculated. In a multi-region case we can assume different distributions of the shock
across regions that are consistent with equation (11).
In Section 6 we investigate how both optimal inflation weights and welfare losses are af-
fected by such alternative distributions.
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4 Welfare comparison
The main goal of the ECB is to stabilize the Monetary Union Index of Consumer Prices
(MUICP), which is a weighted average of the single regions HICP index, and the weights are the
economic size of each region. However, Benigno (2004) shows that in a two-region model with
asymmetries in price rigidity, the optimal policy involves giving higher weights to the inflation
in regions with a higher degree of nominal rigidity. In order to investigate to what extent the
two region results hold in a multi-region setting, we derive the optimal monetary policy and
then evaluate it against two alternative policy regimes. Firstly, a pure inflation targeting regime,
in which aggregate inflation weights the inflation of each region according to its economy size.
Secondly, an optimal inflation targeting regime, in which the weights to each region inflation
are chosen optimally.
The optimal monetary policy is obtained as the minimization of a deadweight loss from the
discounted sum of a weighted average of the average utility flows of all households across all
regions K, assuming that the liquidity services provided from holding real money balances are
small. The welfare criterion is therefore defined as:
Wt = E0
∞∑
j=0
K∑
i=1
βjni
[
U(Cjt+j)−
∫ 1
0
V (yt+jj , z
j
t+j)dj
]
, (12)
To evaluate welfare we use a second-order Taylor expansion of Wt around the steady state,
as in Woodford (2003) and Benigno (2004), which leads to re-write equation (12) as: Wt =
−ΩEt
∑
∞
j=0 β
jLt+j,with
Lt+j = Λ[c
W
t+j − c¯
W ]2+Γ[
K∑
i=1
ni(Pˆ
R
i,t− P˜
R
i,t)
2] +
K∑
i=1
ςi(pi
i
t+j)
2+ t.i.p.+ o(‖ξ‖3), (13)
where t.i.p. denotes parameters independent from policy, o(‖ξ‖3) includes terms of third or
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higher order and the coefficients Ω, Λ, Γ, ςi and di are defined as:
Ω ≡
1
2
UCC¯(
K∑
i=1
nid
i)σ(1 + ση),
Λ ≡
1
σ
(
K∑
i=1
ni(k
i
C)
−1)−1,
Γ ≡
1
σ
(
K∑
i=1
ni(k
i
P )
−1)−1,
ςi ≡
nid
i
(
∑K
i=1 nid
i)
,
di ≡
αi
(1− αi)(1− αiβ)
.
The loss function (13) shows that a currency union has three sources of inefficiency. First,
an inefficient output level, second, inefficient price dispersion and, third, inefficient response
of relative prices to asymmetric shocks due to price stickiness. Equation (13) shows that the
first best option is one in which the central bank offsets the three inefficiencies. However this
outcome is not feasible if the degree of price stickiness differs across regions because of the
mismatch between objectives and instruments.
As described in the next section we use Wt to derive the optimal monetary policy. However,
we use the unconditional expectation of the welfare function (as in Woodford, 1999), to compare
the welfare loss in alternative monetary policies:
W = 100 · Ω · E(E0Wt+j)
W = −100 · Ω ·
[
Λvar (yˆwt ) + Γ
K∑
i=0
nivar
(
PˆRi,t − P˜
R
i,t
)
+
K∑
i=0
ςivar (pˆii,t)
]
, (14)
where UCC¯ has been normalized to 1. The expectation E0 is calculated at time zero based on
all the information available at that date. Its conditionality is based on the initial conditions of
the two state variables PˆRi,t−1 = 0 and P˜Ri,t−1 = 0. The expectation E is obtained by integrating
over the stationary distributions of P˜Ri,t,−1.
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4.1 The optimal plan
The central bank chooses
{
yˆwt , pˆii,t, Pˆ
R
i,t
}
to minimize the welfare function (12) subject to the
New Keynesian Phillips curves (9) and the definition of relative prices (10). In this work we
let ϕi,t be the Lagrange multiplier associated with equation (9) and ψi,t the Lagrange multiplier
associated with equation (10), and assume the initial conditions ϕi,−1 = ψi,−1 = pˆi,−1 = 0.
Having solved the optimization problem, we write the equilibrium conditions as a system
of first order stochastic difference equations:
A · xˆt+1 = B · xˆt + C · εt.
where the column vector xˆt+1 contains all the endogenous and exogenous variables of the model{
yˆwt+1, Pˆ
R
i,t+1 − P˜
R
i,t+1, pˆii,t+1, ψi,t, P˜
R
i,t+1, Pˆ
R
i,t, ϕi,t
}
, while εt is the column vector of regional
specific shocks. The square matrices A and B are functions of the structural parameters of
the model. The system is reduced to the following state space form representation:
xˆt = D · sˆt
sˆt = G · sˆt−1 +H · εt,
where the column vector sˆt contains the state variables of the system
{
P˜Ri,t, Pˆ
R
i,t−1, ϕi,t−1
}
.
4.2 Inflation targeting
As mentioned in the previous section, we use the optimal plan as a benchmark to evaluate the
performance of alternative inflation targeting rules. Following Benigno (2004), we focus on two
different rules. The first one is a pure inflation targeting rule where the measure of inflation that
the central bank aims to stabilize is the average inflation rate of the K regions, which means
K∑
i=0
nipˆii,t = pˆi
w
t = 0 (15)
15
This measure of inflation resembles the actual goal of the ECB. Equation (15) can be interpreted
as the MUICP (Monetary Union Index of Consumer Prices), which is a weighted sum of the
single regions HICP index weighted by the economic size of each region. We compare the
welfare loss entailed by this rule with the one obtained under the optimal inflation targeting
defined as
K∑
i=0
γopti pˆii,t = 0,
where the weights γopti are not given by the economic size of the regions, but chosen optimally
in order to minimize the welfare loss (12) with the following constraints:
γopti ∈ [0, 1] , for i = 1....K
and
K∑
i=0
γopti = 1.
It can be easily shown that if the central bank follows an inflation targeting rule, the vari-
ables
{
yˆwt , pˆii,t, Pˆ
R
i,t
}
can be written as linear combinations of two groups of state variables: the
relative prices PˆRi,t−1 and the natural level of relative prices P˜Ri,t. Hence the system of equations
under inflation targeting assumption becomes:
zˆt = D · zˆt−1 +H · εt,
where zˆt is the column vector of variables
{
P˜Ri,t+1, yˆ
w
t+1, Pˆ
R
i,t+1 − P˜
R
i,t+1, pˆii,t+1, Pˆ
R
i,t
}
. All the
entries of the square matrix D are zeros with the exception of the first and the last K columns
corresponding to the state variables.
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5 Calibration
To simulate the model we calibrate the structural parameters. The level of price stickiness
(αc and αs) and the economic sizes of the regions/sectors (nc and ns) are calibrated using
microdata on price stickiness in Europe as well as the weights used by Eurostat to create the
MUICP index for regions and the HICP index for sectors, as described in Section 2 (Table 1).
The structural parameters that are common across sectors and regions are calibrated follow-
ing Benigno (2004) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The intertemporal discount factor
(β) is set equal to 0.99, which approximately corresponds to a gross real rate of return (β−1)
of 1.01 on average and on a quarterly basis. The degree of monopolistic competition (σ) is set
equal to 7.66, which corresponds to a mark up of prices over marginal cost of around 15%.12
The risk aversion coefficient (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption (ρ)), is set equal to 0.16 as in Benigno (2004).13 Assuming that the average real
wage with respect to variations in production is 0.5 in the Euro Area14, the value of ρ is compat-
ible with an elasticity of labor supply equal to 0.67, which is in line with the micro and macro
evidence, as described in Keane and Rogerson (2012). Assuming labor as the only input factor
in the production function, such value implies that in the steady state workers allocate around
60% of their time to working activity.
We set the parameter φ, which measures the degree of persistence of the Markovian process
for the relative price under flexible prices, equal to 0.95 and the variance of the region specific
white noise shocks σ2ǫ equal to 0.00862. This is consistent with the international RBC literature
on the calibration of asymmetric productivity shocks.
12We also experimented with values between 4 and 11, as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Carvalho
(2006), and results remain robust.
13We also try a risk aversion coefficient equal to 1 as a robustness check.
14Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) calibrate a value of 0.47 for the US. We also try this value for a robustness
check.
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6 Results
In this section we present the results of the simulations. We start by considering whether
our multi-region model is consistent with the two-region model developed in Benigno (2004).
In order to replicate the same calibration exercise as in Benigno (2004), the 10 regions are split
into two macro regions of approximately equal size. For this purpose it is convenient to include
Italy, Austria, Belgium, France and Portugal in the first macro region, whereas we include
Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg in the second macro region. In this
way the shares of aggregate consumption in these two macro regions work out at about 50.1%
and 49.9% of the total. The size of each macro region is computed as the sum of the economic
sizes of the regions belonging to it, and price stickiness as a weighted average of the stickiness
of each country within each macro region, where the weights are given by the economic size of
each country (nr).
In a model with two equal size regions implementing an asymmetric shock to flexible rela-
tive prices, such as the one described in Section 3.2, turns out to be straightforward, since the
shock impacting on the two macro regions has the same size and opposite sign. Although the
two macro regions have different degrees of price stickiness, the changes in relative prices in
the first region mimics exactly the changes in the second region. The same reasoning applies to
inflation which has the same size and opposite sign in the two macro regions.
Table 2 reports the welfare reduction, expressed in terms of consumption units, for the three
different policies derived in Section 4: inflation targeting WIT , optimal targeting WOT and
optimal plan WOP . The deadweight loss reduction (DR) represents the percentage reduction in
the deadweight loss that society can obtain by using the optimal inflation targeting instead of
the pure inflation targeting. The percentage reduction is calculated as
DR ≡
E[WIT ]− E[WOT ]
E[WIT ]− E[WOP ]
× 100
Table 2 shows that optimal targeting outperforms inflation targeting. In fact, the implied welfare
reduction measured by the unconditional loss function in equation (14) comes very close to that
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of the optimal plan. As pointed out in Benigno (2004), when the central bank is allowed to
optimally choose the weights, it turns out to be welfare improving to assign higher weights
(with respect to its economic size) to the region with more sluggish prices. The bottom panel of
Table 2 shows that the same applies if we consider sectors instead of regions. Given that price
stickiness in the two macro sectors is very dispersed compared to the macro regions, the sector
optimal weights turn out to be different from the ones imposed by pure inflation targeting.15
Table 2: A two region/sector model
Regions
economic size shock proportion price adjustment optimal weights
(nr) (pr) (1− αr) (γoptr )
Macro Region1 50.13 + 15.99 45.03
Macro Region2 49.87 - 14.02 54.97
inflation targeting optimal targeting optimal plan DR
welfare reduction -0.1035 -0.1021 -0.1021 97.84
Sectors
economic size shock proportion price adjustment optimal weights
(ns) (ps) (1− αs) (γopts )
Macro Sector1 50.20 + 6.14 91.73
Macro Sector2 49.80 - 27.74 8.27
inflation targeting optimal targeting optimal plan DR
welfare reduction -0.1690 -0.0843 -0.0822 97.53
Table Notes
Macro Region1: Italy, Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal; Macro Region2: Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg.
Macro Sector1: Restaurants and Hotels, Housing, Furnishing, Household Equipment, Miscellaneous Goods and Services, Processed food.
Macro Sector2: Recreation and Culture, Transport and Communications, Clothing, Unprocessed food, Energy.
DR: Deadweight Loss Reduction
The interaction among variables becomes more complex in a multi-region model. The cen-
tral bank itself faces a minimization problem where the welfare loss depends on several vari-
ables (i.e. aggregate output gap, relative prices and inflation rates for each region). Moreover,
we need to decide how the different regions are affected by asymmetric shock to flexible relative
prices. In fact, it differs from a two region model because there are several alternative patterns
of asymmetric shocks that satisfy the condition imposed by equation (11).
15Note that when we group together different regions, averaging their price stickiness and economic size, we
disregard the differences across regions. However, the analysis is focused on evaluating what happens within each
macro region when we take explicitly into account that regions have a different economic size and a different
degree of price stickiness. In particular, we are interested in testing whether the ‘stickiness principle’ holds within
each macro region or only between the two macro regions.
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In this analysis we assume that half the regions experience a positive shock to their flexible
relative price, which means that their relative prices increase, whereas the other half incurs
a negative shock, with an implied relative price decrease. We also assume that the shock is
uniformly distributed within each macro region.
As pointed out by Benigno (2004), when all regions have the same degree of price stickiness
the optimal weights coincide with the economic size of the regions and pure inflation targeting
leads to the same welfare loss as the optimal plan16. When we relax this assumption we are able
to evaluate how the optimal weights change with the degree of price rigidity and the welfare
gain implied by an optimal inflation targeting.
In Table 3 and 4 we report the results of our multi-region model. In particular, we look,
on the one hand, at different combinations of countries belonging to each of the two macro
regions. In Panel A of both tables, regions are split into the same macro regions reported in
Table 2 whereas in Panel B of both tables we group the first five more rigid regions together and
then the first five more flexible ones . On the other hand, in order to gain more insight into the
results, we compare the case in which all regions have the same economic size (Table 3), with
that in which the observed size of each region is considered (Table 4). Observing regions with
the same economic size is interesting because it implies that the two macro regions have the
same size and consequently are hit by shocks characterized by the same intensity and opposite
sign. In other words, the regions in Table 3 differ only in their price stickiness and the sign of
the shock that impacts on their relative prices.
Tables 3 and 4 show that, although optimal inflation targeting clearly outperforms inflation
targeting in terms of welfare reduction, results on the optimal weights tend to partially contrast
with the ‘stickiness principle’, since the optimal weights are not strictly allocated according
to the degree of rigidity in the frequency of price adjustment. In the specific examples that
we put forward the region with the higher degree of price adjustment rigidity within macro
regions receives the highest weight. Italy, the most rigid region in Table 3 (Panel A), holds the
highest weight (26.45%) and Spain, the most rigid region in the second macro group, holds the
16We confirm this result in a multi-region setting.
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second highest weight (13.92%) although its price adjustment frequency is higher with respect
to other regions. The same pattern emerges in Panel B where the stickiest regions in the two
macro regions are Italy (57.89%) and Belgium (31.70%). The optimal weights are not strictly
allocated according to the sluggishness of their price adjustment, even though the less/more
sticky macro region/sector receives a lower/higher weight with respect to its economic size,
within each group.
The exercise shows that in a context of asymmetric shocks to relative prices, the optimal
inflation weights are not exclusively related to price stickiness and economic size, but also
to how the shocks are distributed across regions. The optimal weights are sensitive to the
composition of the macro regions (Panel A versus Panel B) and to the economic size/shock
intensity of the two macro regions (Table 3 versus Table 4), showing that there is no simple
rule-of-thumb to establish the optimal weights.
Table 5 reports simulations on economic sectors and shows that the results are similar to
the regional analysis. We still assume that half of the sectors receive a uniformly distributed
positive shock to the flexible relative price and the other half a uniformly distributed negative
shock. We include in the first group Restaurants and Hotels, Housing, Furnishing and House-
hold Equipment, Miscellaneous Goods and Services and Processed Food while in the second
group we include Recreation and Culture, Transport and Communications, Clothing, Unpro-
cessed Food and Energy. Table 5 shows that the most sticky sector in each group receives the
highest optimal weight. Interestingly, in line with the findings in the literature that proposes the
stabilization of a core price index that excludes goods with a high frequency of price change
(Bryan and Cecchetti, 1994; Aoki, 2001; Cogley, 2002; Eusepi et al., 2011), we observe that
food and energy also receive very low weights in this context. Finally, for sectors the welfare
gain due to optimal inflation targeting is also high.
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Table 3: Optimal weights with equal Economic size (Regions)
PANEL A
economic size shock proportion price adjustment optimal weights
(nr) (pr) (1− αr) (γoptr )
Italy 10.00 + 10.00 26.45
Austria 10.00 + 15.40 1.24
Belgium 10.00 + 17.60 3.09
France 10.00 + 20.90 12.23
Portugal 10.00 + 21.10 9.42
Spain 10.00 - 13.30 13.92
Germany 10.00 - 13.50 11.75
Netherlands 10.00 - 16.20 9.77
Finland 10.00 - 20.30 1.11
Luxembourg 10.00 - 23.00 11.03
Macro Region1a 50.00 + 17.00 50.60
Macro Region2a 50.00 - 17.26 49.40
inflation targeting optimal targeting optimal plan DR
welfare reduction -0.0999 -0.0999 -0.0999 97.67
PANEL B
economic size shock proportion price adjustment optimal weights
(nr) (pr) (1− αr) (γoptr )
Italy 10.00 + 10.00 57.89
Spain 10.00 + 13.30 0.02
Germany 10.00 + 13.50 0.02
Austria 10.00 + 15.40 0.03
Netherlands 10.00 + 16.20 10.34
Belgium 10.00 - 17.60 31.70
Finland 10.00 - 20.30 0.01
France 10.00 - 20.90 0.00
Portugal 10.00 - 21.10 0.00
Luxembourg 10.00 - 23.00 0.00
Macro Region1b 50.00 + 13.68 65.58
Macro Region2b 50.00 - 20.58 34.42
inflation targeting optimal targeting optimal plan DR
welfare reduction -0.1107 -0.0987 -0.0985 98.79
Table Notes
Macro Region 1a: Italy, Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal;
Macro Region 2a: Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg.
Macro Region 1b: Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, Netherlands;
Macro Region 2b: Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal, Luxembourg.
DR: Deadweight Loss Reduction.
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Table 4: Optimal weights with unequal Economic size (Regions)
PANEL A
economic size shock proportion price adjustment optimal weights
(nr) (pr) (1− αr) (γoptr )
Italy 19.89 + 10.0 24.97
Austria 3.25 + 15.40 0.09
Belgium 3.51 + 17.60 0.18
France 21.19 + 20.90 14.96
Portugal 2.29 + 21.10 8.13
Spain 12.49 - 13.30 13.96
Germany 30.00 - 13.50 29.07
Netherlands 5.44 - 16.20 0.21
Finland 1.65 - 20.30 0.09
Luxembourg 0.29 - 23.00 8.33
Macro Region 1a 50.13 + 16.00 45.01
Macro Region 2a 49.87 - 14.02 54.99
inflation targeting optimal targeting optimal plan DR
welfare reduction -0.1026 -0.1007 -0.1007 99.17
PANEL B
economic size shock proportion price adjustment optimal weights
(nr) (pr) (1− αr) (γoptr )
Italy 19.89 + 10.00 74.97
Spain 12.49 + 13.30 0.05
Germany 30.00 + 13.50 0.05
Austria 3.25 + 15.40 0.09
Netherlands 5.44 + 16.20 9.48
Belgium 3.51 - 17.60 15.34
Finland 1.65 - 20.30 0.01
France 21.19 - 20.90 0.01
Portugal 2.29 - 21.10 0.01
Luxembourg 0.29 - 23.00 0.00
Macro Region 1b 71.07 + 12.78 83.87
Macro Region 2b 28.93 - 20.50 16.13
inflation targeting optimal targeting optimal plan DR
welfare reduction -0.0469 -0.0398 -0.0397 99.03
Table Notes
Macro Region 1a: Italy, Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal;
Macro Region 2a: Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg.
Macro Region 1b: Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, Netherlands;
Macro Region 2b: Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal, Luxembourg.
DR: Deadweight Loss Reduction.
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Table 5: Optimal weights with unequal Economic size (Sectors)
PANEL A
economic size shock proportion price adjustment optimal weights
(ns) (ps) (1− αs) (γopts )
Restaurant and Hotels 30.30 + 4.20 63.27
Housing 2.70 + 6.50 0.24
Furnishing Household Equipment 5.00 + 7.20 0.19
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 4.80 + 7.30 0.19
Processed food 7.40 + 12.50 9.40
Recreation and Culture 6.50 - 6.60 0.42
Transport and Communications 8.50 - 7.20 1.00
Clothing 16.20 - 8.40 24.70
Unprocessed food 7.80 - 37.20 0.58
Energy 10.80 - 78.80 0.01
Macro Sector 1a 50.20 + 6.14 91.74
Macro Sector 2a 49.80 - 27.74 8.26
inflation targeting optimal targeting optimal plan DR
welfare reduction -0.151 -0.0834 -0.0834 99.99
PANEL B
economic size shock proportion price adjustment optimal weights
(nr) (pr) (1− αr) (γoptr )
Restaurant and Hotels 30.30 + 4.20 79.89
Housing 2.70 + 6.50 0.17
Recreation and Culture 6.50 + 6.60 0.17
Furnishing Household Equipment 5.00 + 7.20 0.73
Transport Communications 8.50 + 7.20 0.44
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 4.80 - 7.30 3.50
Clothing 16.20 - 8.40 15.01
Processed food 7.40 - 12.50 0.01
Unprocessed food 7.80 - 37.20 0.07
Energy 10.80 - 78.80 0.01
Macro Sector 1b 53.00 + 5.38 94.72
Macro Sector 2b 47.00 - 29.89 5.28
inflation targeting optimal targeting optimal plan DR
welfare reduction -0.1523 -0.0738 -0.0738 99.99
Table Notes
Macro Sector 1a: Restaurant and Hotels, Housing, Furnishing Household Equipment, Miscellaneous
Goods and Services, Processed Food; Macro Sector 2a: Recreation and Culture, Transport and
Communications, Clothing, Unprocessed Food, Energy. Macro Sector 1b: Restaurant and Hotels,
Housing, Recreation and Culture, Furnishing Household Equipment, Transport and Communications;
Macro Sector 2b: Miscellaneous Goods and Services, Clothing, Processed Food
Unprocessed Food, Energy. DR: Deadweight Loss Reduction.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates optimal inflation targeting for the Euro Area using a multi-region
model with asymmetric demand shocks. The analysis shows that in a multi-region context the
optimal weights result from complex interactions between the degree of price stickiness, eco-
nomic size and the distribution of the shocks within regions. A similar result holds when we use
the model to match the different degrees of nominal price rigidities across sectors. Therefore,
assigning higher weights to the regions or sectors with a higher degree of nominal rigidities is
not necessarily the optimal policy and there is no simple rule-of-thumb that the central bank
can follow to guide the choice of the optimal weights. Simulations show that the welfare gain
from choosing the weights optimally may be substantial compared to a pure inflation targeting
regime that weights each regional inflation rate according to the economic size of the region.
The analysis shows that further progress is needed for a comprehensive assessment on the
welfare consequences of heterogeneity in nominal rigidities across regions and sectors. For
instance, it would certainly be interesting to extend the model with a segmented labor market,
reflecting the limited labor mobility in Europe. In addition, the analysis should also be extended
to investigate other sources of heterogeneity such as heterogeneity in the labor shares or in
the shocks disturbing each region and sector. Our paper particularly investigated the effect of
asymmetric demand shocks that move relative prices across regions, however more analysis is
needed to extend the number of shocks included in the model to study their effect on the optimal
weights and enable an empirical evaluation of the structural model. These investigations remain
open for future research.
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